NATIONAL IDENTITY: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, NATIONAL MEMORY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

Authors:

Petro Burkovskyi — executive director of the Ilko Kucheriv "Democratic Initiatives'' Foundation. Head of the project group;

Serhiy Galetiy — producer, member of the National Union of Cinematographers of Ukraine (1st stage);

Volodymyr Golovko — senior researcher at the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (1st stage);

Dmytro Horevoy — director of the public organization "Religious Security Center"

Olesya Ostrovska-Lyuta — Director of State Enterprise "Mystetskyi Arsenal" (1st stage);

Maryna Pezenti — member of the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Institute in London, independent expert (1st stage);

Oleksandr Sahan — head of the Department of Religious Studies at the Institute of Philosophy named after H.S. Skovoroda of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine;

Taras Shamayda — co-coordinator of the "Space of Freedom" movement;

Yaryna Yasynevych — program director of the The Center for research on the Liberation Movement;

Andriy Kohut — Director of the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (2nd stage);

Oksana Zabolotna — analyst (2nd stage);

Oleh Savichuk — analyst (2nd stage);

Oksana Poltavets — head of the Department of Communication and Information and Analytical Support of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (2nd stage);

Group manager:

Danylo Metelskyi, Director of the NGO "Center of Social Transformations" and Senior Lecturer of the Department of International Relations at NaUKMA, project manager

Ukrainians' awareness of themselves as a united nation with a rich language, great cultural heritage, and outstanding potential to create a modern and competitive cultural product, an edifying and complex history that has yet to be comprehended and passed on to the descendants, as well as an openness and respect for world religions, is further strengthened in the hour of the unrelenting struggle against the terrible evil of Russian fascism.

The test of war has shown that Ukrainians think of themselves as a civic nation and perceive themselves as Europeans not only based on geography or history but also by their vocation to defend European values of freedom, justice, and dignity, with arms in hand against the enemy and through honest, professional debate with partners and allies.

The high price that Ukrainians pay for their freedom and the security of Europe sets the bar high for politics, which should nurture and develop a national identity. Therefore, it is very important to find a balanced, professional, and practical approach to formulating the objectives and means of such a policy.

The language policy is aimed at creating conditions for competent, fluent command of the Ukrainian language by all citizens, ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life on the entire territory of Ukraine; preserving the language environment of indigenous peoples and national minorities; encouraging all Ukrainians to improve their language skills and learn foreign languages and actively use all the languages they have learned throughout their lives.

The cultural policy focuses on the introduction of contemporary management practices designed to develop Ukrainian cultural and creative industries and make market forces work towards the preservation, enrichment, and spread of Ukrainian culture; on changing the attitude of the state authorities towards culture - from a bias towards chronic recipients of public funds and the desire to subject cultural organizations to particular interests to targeted development of creative human potential and partnership in creative projects that contribute to strengthening Ukraine's national identity and international authority.

The policy of national memory creates a supportive public and media environment for a constant process of critical reflection on the lessons of the distant and recent past, makes it impossible to exploit the complexes of national inferiority or superiority and exceptionalism in foreign and domestic policy, allows for a mutual understanding with European neighbors regarding the traumas of the past, preserves, honors, and promotes the memory of Ukrainians' fight for freedom and opposition to hatemongering imperial regimes.

Policy in the realm of church-state relations is consistent with the principles of the rule of law, guarantees the right to freedom of conscience, equality of all religious believers before the law, security for all citizens, and protection from destructive influence under the guise of clerical practice, promotes critical perception of religious doctrines and tolerance towards all faiths within society.

1. LANGUAGE POLICY

1.1 State of affairs in language policy as of early 2023

The Russian Empire’s and the Soviet Union's policy of driving Ukrainian and minority languages out of public life to ensure an artificial dominance of the Russian language was one of the main instruments of Ukraine's oppression.

Even after declaring independence in 1991 and establishing the status of the Ukrainian language as the sole state language in the Constitution of Ukraine, the russification has not stopped.

In the 2001 census, 78% of Ukrainian citizens identified themselves as Ukrainians in nationality, but only 67% said Ukrainian was their native language. In reality, only about half of Ukrainian citizens spoke Ukrainian in private or public life , in the 2000s.

Over the first decade of the twenty-first century, Russian language still dominated many spheres of public life, and Russia actively used the language issue to fracture Ukrainian society.

The norms of the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR, adopted in 1989, could no longer hinder these processes. The official declaratory status of the Ukrainian language was devalued by Russia's use of market mechanisms to push and popularize Russian-language cultural products.

In addition, the status of the Ukrainian language was being diluted through the adoption of new legislation. The selective implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was used to preserve the dominance of the Russian language. Finally, in 2012, the unconstitutionally adopted Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy launched the process of dismantling outdated and formal norms designed to protect the Ukrainian language.

The situation changed dramatically as a result of the Revolution of Dignity. Since 2014, Russia's armed aggression has been accompanied by the violent eradication of the Ukrainian language in the occupied territories and was openly justified by the notion of the "superiority" of the Russian language. The overt physical threat to the existence of the Ukrainian language has led to a level of social cohesion unprecedented in the earlier years of independence. For most Ukrainian citizens, the Ukrainian language becomes one of the most important attributes of civic identity, national unity, and state independence. This public attitude becomes the main driver for updating the state's language policy.

Ukrainian has finally started becoming the primary language of film distribution, strengthening its position in the media and book market. Quotas for Ukrainian-language songs established in 2016 increased their share of radio airtime tenfold. The Law on Education, adopted in 2017, defined Ukrainian as the language of instruction for all forms and levels of education.

A defining event in the language policy of independent Ukraine was the adoption of the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language (the Language Law) in 2019. Its main objective is to guarantee every person in Ukraine the right to receive information and services in the state language in all spheres of public life.

Implementing the law’s key provisions in 2019-2022 led to a significant increase in the prevalence of the Ukrainian language in many public spheres (including commercial services) and in people's everyday communication. Special state regulatory bodies tasked with monitoring compliance with language legislation – the State Language Protection Commissioner and the National Commission for State Language Standards – were launched. Ukrainian language proficiency exams were introduced for applicants for public bodies’ offices and for acquiring Ukrainian citizenship.

The Law on Complete Secondary Education and the amendments to the Law on Higher Education set out a requirement for the educational process to be conducted in Ukrainian and provided broad opportunities to use official EU languages, primarily English, in educational institutions.

At the same time, the first steps have been taken to overcome the consequences of Russian colonialism and the destruction of Ukraine's indigenous peoples. The relevant law adopted in 2021 provides broad opportunities for the development of indigenous languages in accordance with Ukrainian language legislation and European and international standards.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to an increase in support for the Ukrainian language and a massive transition to Ukrainian.

Meanwhile, state language policy remains inconsistent.. The state budget for 2023 does not provide funds for the implementation of the effective Law 2313-IX, which guarantees financial support for bookstores selling books in the Ukrainian language, languages of the EU, and indigenous languages.

In violation of the law, the State Program for Promoting the Learning of the State Language has not yet been approved, and a network of free Ukrainian language courses for adults, including internally displaced persons, has not been created.

A serious problem is the russification of a significant number of children and youth, primarily through the consumption of Russian-language content on the Internet.

More than half of Ukrainian refugees abroad speak mostly Russian and lack sufficient opportunities to communicate in a Ukrainian language environment.

On the occupied territories of Ukraine, especially in the Crimea and certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Russian authorities openly pursue an assimilationist policy and ban the Ukrainian language.

Ukraine's European integration presents our country with the task, on the one hand, of harmonizing language legislation with the law of the European Union and find common ground with EU member states, and on the other hand, of preventing the loss of mechanisms for protecting the state language.

This balance has so far been achieved with the adoption of the new version of the Law on National Minorities and the Law on Media, which are seen as a necessary precondition for starting negotiations on Ukraine's EU membership.

It is important to prevent a dangerous revision of the language provisions of these laws under external pressure. Ukraine should continue an active dialogue with EU member states to reach an understanding based on equality and mutual respect. Ukraine should consider the experience of the Baltic states, which defended the principles of internal language policy during their integration into the EU.

The low level of proficiency in foreign languages, especially English, remains a serious problem for European integration, international cooperation, and the effective use of global science and culture achievements. According to a survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in October 2022, 85% of Ukrainians have studied a foreign language (other than Russian), but only 9.7% of these citizens admitted that they had a high (1.3%) or good (8.4%) level of foreign language proficiency.

The government's intention to raise that level deserves support. However, the chosen path of drafting a special law granting English a special status is wrong and not typical for European countries. Instead, systematic actions by the governmentare required to ensure that English is properly taught in educational institutions and that teachers, researchers, students, and a wide range of politicians and public officials improve their English language skills. The state should encourage citizens to learn other foreign languages of the European Union and languages recognized as official working languages in international and regional organizations important for the protection of Ukraine's national interests.

1.2 Vision of language policy in the perspective of 2030, including measurement indicators

The majority of citizens perceive competent fluency in the Ukrainian language (in accordance with the requirements of Ukrainian spelling and other standards) as an integral sign of education and civic awareness, regardless of one's background and position.

As of the end of October 2022, according to a nationwide survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (not including the temporarily occupied territories), 78% of Ukrainian citizens always or mostly speak Ukrainian. This figure is growing annually in all regions.

Ukrainian is the main language of communication and information intake in all regions of Ukraine (except for the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, where the rate of communication and information intake in Ukrainian is growing steadily).

The Language Law is implemented in all public spheres across Ukraine.

95% of TV and radio programs are broadcast in Ukrainian.
95% of the content in the Ukrainian online media is in Ukrainian.
95% of the total circulation and titles of publishing products and print media is published in Ukrainian.
More than 90% of books in bookstores (including online) and more than 50% in public libraries are in Ukrainian.
All software sold or produced in Ukraine, as well as used in government, local administration, and educational institutions, has a Ukrainian language interface.
A legally and financially secured system of incentives operates for national creative industries that produce and distribute products in the Ukrainian language: books, films, music, and digital content for the Internet use.
The share of foreign creative industries products translated into Ukrainian is growing steadily.
Ukrainian citizens use more than 70% of non-musical and more than 30% of musical content on the Internet in Ukrainian, and consumption of content in EU languages surpasses content consumption in Russian.

Each person's right to receive information and services in Ukrainian is well protected. The State Language Protection Commissioner has sufficient independence and resources, including representative offices in all regions of Ukraine, to execute their statutory mandate.

Ukrainian language teaching materials and courses are available to everyone throughout Ukraine.

Most Ukrainian citizens and ethnic Ukrainians living abroad communicate with each other primarily in Ukrainian and teach Ukrainian to their children.

The state promotes the study of the Ukrainian language by foreigners in Ukraine and abroad, the spread of the Ukrainian language in foreign countries, primarily in Europe (including the use of Ukrainian as one of the languages for websites, reference books, technology interfaces, audio guides, etc., and the popularization and increase in sales of Ukrainian-language songs and books abroad, both offline and in digital format).

Ukrainian is the main language of interethnic communication in Ukraine.

The state language policy is aimed at achieving the following benchmarks:

95% of the country's adult population speaks Ukrainian proficiently (C1/C2).
75% of the adult population of Ukraine speaks English at the B1/B2 level.
25% of the adult population speaks at least two or more foreign languages at the B2 level.

Public authorities are committed to overcoming the consequences of the Russian occupation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Crimea. The state provides adequate methodological, financial, and professional support for mastering the state language by residents of the de-occupied territories and restoring its full functioning in all spheres of public life in the de-occupied territories as soon as possible, including the involvement of educational, cultural, and public administration experts from other regions of Ukraine, restoration/reorganization of the Ukrainian education system, an extensive network of free Ukrainian language courses, etc.

A system of governmental support for preserving and developing the Crimean Tatar language and other languages of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine operates. The state provides support for the creation and distribution of cultural products in the Crimean Tatar language, the use of this language in the media, primarily in Crimea, and guarantees the possibility of obtaining preschool and complete general secondary education in the Crimean Tatar language along with the state language. Many state and local government officials in Crimea should be proficient in the Crimean Tatar language.

Legislation on national minorities guarantees the opportunity for members of these minorities to study in their native language alongside the state language in pre-school and primary school, as well as to study minority languages at any level of education. It establishes mechanisms for the use of minority languages in culture, media, and other areas.

The state pays due attention to the following:

Measures to ensure that the Ukrainian language is included in the list of official languages of the European Union;
Supporting the dialects and accents of the Ukrainian language, preserving the memory of outdated vocabulary and lost dialects/accents;
Developing and supporting the Ukrainian language among socially vulnerable groups and people with special needs. In particular, the free use of Ukrainian sign language in the community of sign language speakers and the convenience and accessibility of Ukrainian for the visually impaired is ensured;
Development and implementation of Ukrainian terminology.

1.3 Key issues to be resolved to achieve the desired outcomes in the language policy

The primary objective is to overcome the structural consequences of russification and Russian colonial policy in Ukraine in general.

The importance of the Ukrainian language for the national security and unity of the state is evidenced by Russia's systematic use of the language issue to undermine the unity of Ukrainian society. The imposition of Russian-language information and cultural products under the guise of "market freedom," especially on the Internet, has made Ukrainian society vulnerable to Russia's destructive cultural and informational influence.

Consequently, the biggest problem for the near future may be the government's neglect of the task of supporting the production and distribution of cultural products in the Ukrainian language.

Specifically, funding of measures aimed at developing and protecting the Ukrainian language, supporting Ukrainian-language products, translations from and into Ukrainian, spreading the Ukrainian language worldwide, etc., is conducted on a residual basis.

Contrary to the requirements of the law, the state program to promote the learning of the state language has not been approved, and the state network of Ukrainian language courses for adults is absent and is not being created.

Insufficient support for the activities of language institutions by supreme government bodies, the creation of artificial obstacles to the adequate work of these institutions, as well as attempts to deprive them of their independence are undermining the implementation of a high-quality and consistent language policy.

Some business owners and managers oppose establishing Ukrainian language in various sectors of the economy and services.

The resistance of influential media holdings hinders the introduction of reliable mechanisms to support and protect the Ukrainian language in media legislation.

As a result of the linguistic genocide and total russification of the territories occupied by Russia (primarily in Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, where the occupation has been ongoing since 2014), on these territories the Ukrainian language has been completely forced out of all public domains, a significant part of the population does not speak Ukrainian or has poor command of the language, and has been affected by anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Local staff capable of changing the situation after the de-occupation is extremely scarce. The language of the Crimean Tatar people also finds itself in a position of oppression in occupied Crimea.

The level of foreign language proficiency among Ukrainians remains poor.

The lack of in-depth research and scientific data about the language issue remains a serious problem, mainly because no census has been conducted in Ukraine since 2001.

Retaining academic staff working on the development of Ukrainian and foreign language teaching methodologies conducting research in linguistics, in particular in cooperation with foreign universities, as well as training such staff for the future, is an acute problem.

There is no comprehensive law on overcoming the consequences of Russia's colonial policy (russification) in Ukraine, nor is there a comprehensive policy in this sphere which would provide support for cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious groups that have been persecuted and are now face the threat of losing or eroding their collective identity.

A serious challenge is the attempts by certain EU structures and states in the European integration process to pressure Ukraine to revise its state language policy, speculating on the alleged oppression of national minorities and attempts to antagonize certain minorities against the Ukrainian state. Ukraine needs to put considerable effort into defending its national interests, maintaining adequate support and protecting the Ukrainian language on its path to EU membership.

1.4 The means to solve issues in the language policy in the perspective of 2030

1. Promote the acquisition of Ukrainian by citizens as their native language, the language of citizenship, and interethnic communication

Responsible state authorities: The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU); the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine (MCIP), the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (MES), the National Commission on State Language Standards (Commission on Standards).

Adoption and implementation of the State Program for Promoting the Learning of the State Language, as provided for in the Law of Ukraine On Protecting the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language.
Creation of a state network of free Ukrainian language courses for willing adults across the country.
Support for community language courses, speaking clubs, etc.
Promoting the transition to Ukrainian for all those who consider it their native language and want to overcome the consequences of russification, and popularizing the return of people to their native language.
Ensuring that employees of government agencies, enterprises, institutions and organizations master the state language at the level required by law. Dismissal of persons who do not speak Ukrainian or do not use Ukrainian at the appropriate level in their work.
Ensuring proper quality, convenience, and transparency of the state language proficiency test for Ukrainian citizens, and foreigners seeking Ukrainian citizenship.
Ensuring that employees of government agencies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations master the state language at the level required by law. Dismissal of persons who do not speak Ukrainian or do not use Ukrainian at the appropriate level in their work.
Ensuring adequate Ukrainian language teaching in all educational institutions (including classes and groups with education in other languages), fluency in Ukrainian for all school graduates, and verification of their proficiency through state final examinations.

Implementating of these measures in 2023-2026 will require state and local budget expenditure planning, social awareness campaigns, and informational support.

2. Support the production and distribution of cultural products in the Ukrainian language and eliminate Russian influence in the cultural, and information sphere.

Responsible state authorities: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), President of Ukraine, CMU, MCIP, State Film Agency, State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Book Institute, National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting (National Council).

Immediate Presidential signing and enforcement of the Law of Ukraine 2309-IX on the ban on Russian book imports and promotion of Ukrainian-language book publishing.

Ensuring the implementation of Law 2313-IX on subsidies for the rental of premises by bookstores selling books in the Ukrainian language, EU languages, and indigenous languages, as well as on providing state aid to citizens for the purchase of books.

Translation of popular foreign cultural products (literary works, films, games, etc.) into Ukrainian.

Replenishing library collections with new books in Ukrainian in sufficient quantities, ensuring accessibility and promoting of electronic and audiobooks in Ukrainian.

Ensuring the implementation of the provisions of the Law on Media, the Law on Cinematography, and the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language regarding the broadcasting of programs (primarily films) in Ukrainian.

Approval and implementation of amendments to legislation aimed at supporting the production and mass distribution of high-quality Ukrainian content: songs, films, programs, games, and other cultural products in Ukrainian.

The urgent measures should be implemented by the end of 2023. Implementation of these measures in 2023-2026 will require state budget expenditure planning, social awareness campaigns, and information support.

3. Develop and introduce terminology and standards of the Ukrainian language

Responsible state authorities and involved organizations: VRU, CMU, Commission on Standards, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU)

Development, authorization, and implementation of Ukrainian terminology, in particular, medical and legal terminology, adjustment of terminology in the fields of information technology, cosmetics, and other industries that use international nomenclature and terminology to the Ukrainian language.
Alignment of names of geographical objects, placenames, etc. with the standards of the Ukrainian language.
Adoption of regulations that will ensure the convenient use of the Ukrainian language by sign language speakers, visually impaired people, and other marginalized groups with special needs.
Amending the Laws On Consumer Protection and On General Safety of Non-Food Products to refine the requirements for providing information in Ukrainian about goods and manufacturers, including in trade and when placing information about goods and advertising on the Internet.
Amending technical guidelines regulating the labeling of various types of household and other appliances, equipment, materials, etc., to ensure proper labeling in Ukrainian.

To implement the aforementioned measures in 2023-2026, the state budget must allocate funds for this purpose.

4. Protection of endangered languages, language rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities, and linguistic diversity

Responsible state authorities: VRU, CMU, MCIP, State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (SSEPFC), Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (MFA)

Clarifying the translation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, amending the law on ratification of the Charter to ensure its proper enforcement.

Addressing the language rights and needs of Ukraine's national minorities in accordance with the Law of Ukraine On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine.

Implementation of measures envisaged by the Strategy for the Development of the Crimean Tatar Language for 2022-2032.

Urgent measures to preserve and develop the Karaite and Krymchak languages as languages of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, as well as other endangered languages facing the brink of extinction.

Preservation and support of dialects and accents of the Ukrainian language.

Implementation of these measures in 2023-2030 will require state budget expenditure planning and awareness campaigns.

5. Improving the levels of knowledge and use of foreign languages

Responsible state authorities: VRU, CMU, MCIP, MES.

Amending the education legislation that requires compulsory learning of English in secondary, vocational, professional, pre-university, higher and postgraduate education institutions.
Introducing a B1 English language proficiency standard for admission to higher education institutions.
Expanding the use of English in science and education (including the publication of scientific papers and articles in English, the use of English-language sources, lectures in English, etc.)
Expanding the list of positions in public administration, education, and science that require B2/C1 English proficiency.
Support for educational institutions that provide services for learning a second foreign language listed as the official EU language.
Engaging a significant number of native speakers to teach English and other foreign languages in Ukraine.

Implementation of these measures in 2023-2030 will require state and local budget expenditure planning and awareness campaigns.

6. Countering the consequences of linguocide on the occupied territories

Responsible state authorities: VRU, CMU, MCIP, MES.

Compliance with the requirements of language legislation in the territories to be liberated from Russian occupation. In Crimea and certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions provide for the suspension of penalties for violation of language legislation for some time following liberation.
Development of a program of crash courses in the Ukrainian language and a sufficient number of teachers to work on the liberated territories.
Introduction of transitional educational programs with an intensive study of the Ukrainian language for pre-school, secondary, and vocational education on the liberated territories, which should take effect for the period defined by law.
Establishing proficiency in the Crimean Tatar language as a qualification requirement for appointment to certain positions with the Crimean authorities after the liberation of Crimea.
Providing liberated territories with the necessary number of textbooks, manuals, methodological and other literature in Ukrainian, as well as in languages of indigenous peoples and national minorities that suffered linguocide during the Russian occupation.

Implementation of these measures in 2023-2030 will require state and local budget expenditure planning and awareness campaigns.

7. Promoting the Ukrainian language abroad

Responsible state authorities: VRU, CMU, MCIP, MES, MFA

Development and adoption of a state program for the promotion of the Ukrainian language abroad and cooperation with Ukrainians abroad.
Support for projects aimed at creating and popularizing free online Ukrainian language courses for Ukrainians living abroad.
Support for projects aimed at providing Ukrainians abroad with free access to media, books, films, music, games, and other cultural products in Ukrainian.
Support for Ukrainian language courses and teachers in educational institutions abroad,
Support for projects and educational institutions that teach Ukrainian to foreigners in Ukraine.
Support for projects that promote the use of Ukrainian in foreign countries, primarily in the EU, as a language of websites, reference books, and guides, audio guides, user interfaces, etc.

Implementation of these measures in 2024-2027 will require state and local budget expenditure planning and awareness campaigns.

8. Guaranteeing the protection of the right to language

Responsible state authorities: VRU, CMU, State Language Protection Commissioner, National Council.

Strengthening the institutional capacity of the Office of the State Language Protection Commissioner, including appointing representatives of the Commissioner in all regions of Ukraine and on the liberated territories.
Improving procedural rules on liability for violations of language legislation to ensure that liability for such violations is unavoidable.
Ensuring proper control over the implementation of the legislation on the minimum share of programs, music, and other content in the Ukrainian language in the media and responding to reported violations.

Implementation of these measures in 2024-2025 will require state and local budget expenditure planning and awareness campaigns.

1.5 Red lines which should not be crossed in the language policy

Abolishment or revision of the law on ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language, in particular through the adoption of other legislative acts or amendments to it, is unacceptable.

It is prohibited to take any actions (including support for non-governmental or international initiatives) aimed at preserving the consequences of Russian colonial policy in the language sphere.
Amend/cancel/suspend language legislation under pressure from foreign countries.
Refrain from cutting public spending on the implementation of the language law.
Prevent the formation of enclaves or communities where most citizens do not speak or cannot use Ukrainian.

2. CULTURAL POLICY

2.1 State of affairs in cultural policy as of early 2023

Following the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, a dialogue on the essence of cultural policy is gradually being formed between the state and non-governmental cultural actors. New state institutions are being created, including the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation (UCF), the Ukrainian Book Institute (UBI), and the Ukrainian Institute (UI), which are designed to implement certain aspects of state cultural policy. The professional level of cultural workers and public administrators is increasing, and new opportunities for international cooperation in the cultural sphere are emerging.

However, these changes are neither sustainable nor systemic. Regardless of party affiliation and composition, the government does not consider culture to be a factor of national security and social cohesion, while creative work and creativity are not viewed as important driving forces of the present-day innovation economy.

As a result of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine (since February 2022), the cultural and creative industries have suffered significant losses: funding for key cultural institutions has been cut, the enemy has caused irreversible damage to the cultural heritage fund, there is an exodus of professionals, and the war has resulted in a sharp decline in the availability of cultural services and demand for cultural products.

Meanwhile, martial law is being used to restore the unacceptable practice of "manual control" of key cultural institutions. The Ministry of Cultural and Information Policy is trying to subjugate the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. The State Film Agency of Ukraine shuns accountability, is in conflict with industry professionals, and attempts to liquidate the National Film Archive "Oleksandr Dovzhenko Center", which jeopardizes the preservation of the archival collection.

Critical underfunding of the cultural sphere has become the biggest threat during the war. The reforms of art education and tourism (including the Great Restoration project) have been suspended, and the launch of cultural service centers within local communities has been postponed. State museums, theaters, artistic groups, and other institutions are severely underfunded. This complicates the very institutional functioning and, thus, the basic continuity of operations in the entire sector.

There is a growing threat of losing human capital: because of the war, many women, who made up the bulk of the cultural sector's workforce, have moved abroad. At the same time, many of these female cultural workers have received opportunities for internships, training, residencies, and employment in Western cultural institutions. Provided that they return to Ukraine, they will be able to make a valuable contribution to the postwar reconstruction of the cultural sphere.

Creative industries have suffered enormous losses. The publishing industry has seen a 60% reduction in printing. 40% of specialists employed in creative industries have lost their jobs, and 50% of creative businesses have seen a decline in profits. The market for cultural events has shrunk by 90%. Wage and utility debt has increased.

The war threatens the material cultural heritage. The occupant has damaged or completely destroyed 270 heritage sites. In addition to the damage and destruction, the issue of relocation and preservation of museum collections across Ukraine and the creation of a register of destroyed and existing cultural property has become acute. Hundreds of cultural infrastructure facilities in local communities, such as clubs and libraries, were damaged.

Restoring the capacity of the cultural sector will be impossible without the active involvement of donors. Therefore, the vision of cultural policy should include guidelines for donors, and recovery should be carried out in close cooperation with them.

As a result of the covid pandemic and in the wake of the Russian invasion in February 2022, a number of governance challenges in the cultural sector are becoming more acute.

Low level of management competence among officials responsible for the formation and implementation of cultural policy in the government and local public authorities and managing state and municipal cultural institutions (enterprises). Instability, an employee-hostile bureaucratic subculture, and uncomfortable working conditions lead to an outflow of the most capable performers.

The Government's cultural policy is inconsistent with the current plans on the reform agenda and the vision for the development of society and the country. Since the Government is obliged to manage subordinate organizations, managers lack time for analytical and legislative work. No mechanisms exist to monitor the performance of responsible officials. In particular, they are not required to report publicly to stakeholders and the public.

Outdated rules for using public funds and complicated procedures for generating revenue for state cultural institutions prevent them from launching large innovative projects and developing international cooperation. As a result, the management of public sector institutions is extremely conservative: managers avoid responsibility to prevent violations that entail criminal liability; financial incentives for the best employees are impossible due to the lack of a flexible remuneration policy.

Political interference in the work of core public cultural institutions, such as the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation and the State Film Agency, distorts the functioning of the entire cultural sector and blocks the development of the public and civic cultural sectors. This devalues the work of the institutions in general, as it demonstrates the disconnection between quality work, achievements, best practices, and the actions of the governing bodies. Instead, personal and political loyalty is emphasized and legitimized.

In addition to the state budget's chronic underfunding of the cultural sector, there is a consistent trend of reducing spending on culture from local budgets. The funding of culture at the level of united territorial communities and regions was negatively affected by the abolition of equalization grants for cultural needs in local budgets in 2014.

Funding for cultural institutions does not correspond to the tasks and functions assigned to them and, at best, covers only a part of their expenses, as well as creates a "wage hunger". This causes an outflow of personnel, both in the public and non-governmental sectors. The non-governmental cultural industry also suffers from a lack of funding sources (grants and donors), which leads to the atomization of players, poor expertise and institutional capacity, and the rapid failure of initiatives.

The current system of copyright and related rights protection does not ensure adequate protection of intellectual property rights. A particular problem in the audiovisual sphere is the unresolved issue of royalty payments (including fair remuneration) for the use of copyright and related rights online (on the Internet).

The public network of cultural institutions is more a remnant of the USSR's cultural policy than a product of modern Ukrainian society. Attempts to change this have been hampered by a lack of expertise on the part of the government. Some initiatives, such as reforms of the network of cultural service centers in territorial communities, were halted due to a lack of funds (targeted subventions) and the effects of COVID-19.

The art education system does not match the needs of the cultural goods market and does not address the demands shaped by the recreational practices of contemporary Ukrainian society. Artists often face an outdated and inadequate education system (with the possible exception of higher musical education), and the level of competence of Ukrainian cultural managers is much lower than that of their European counterparts.

Citizens' consumer capacity for cultural goods and services is low. The gap in access to cultural products and services between urban and rural communities is growing. Admittedly, some of the government's efforts to support demand for cultural products have been successful. In particular, the program of electronic vouchers, "ePidtrymka" for the purchase of cultural products and services (cinema, theater, museum, purchasing books) via the "Diia" application.

The quarantine restriction policy (2020-2021) aimed at preventing the spread of COVID-19 has seriously deteriorated the condition in the cultural and creative industries. Many cultural and artistic projects were closed, and events were postponed. Some projects have switched to online mode to retain their audience, which has both positive consequences and drawbacks, as it requires additional efforts and costs. Border closures have slowed down artistic and cultural exchanges. As a result of this crisis, the income of CCI entities has decreased significantly.

2.2 Vision of cultural policy in the perspective of 2030

By 2030, not only should post-war recovery occur, but also a shift in approaches to planning and implementing cultural policy. In particular, the level of funding for culture in 2030 should surpass the 2019 figures.

As a result, culture is actively developing in Ukraine: cultural life is diverse, with elements of innovation, experimentation, and bold interpretations, and an open discussion of critical social issues is ongoing. Cultural life is based on freedom of speech and expression, so all institutions and individuals are free to choose their topics and means of expression. Restrictions on freedom of speech are debated in professional communities and established through bottom-up professional consensus rather than governmental decrees.

Organizational and legal conditions for intellectual and creative work are favorable: national legislation on copyright and related rights is harmonized with European legal norms, the mechanism for receiving remuneration in all creative sectors is effective, and the results of this work are protected. Legal protection of intellectual property is improving.

Creative industries enjoy a supportive tax climate, and the government promotes them abroad, as well as among children and youth. As a result, specialists are returning to the country to work in this area.

One of the important elements of recovery is to maintain the transformations and institutions launched in the period 2014-2022, particularly the system-forming institutions such as UCF, UIC, State Film Agency and UI, whose practices are emulated by local cultural foundations. Competitive principles of selecting managers and good governance are in place, and decision-making is based on analytics and public consensus.

Given the unprecedented interest of the global audience in Ukraine, opportunities have been created to promote Ukrainian culture abroad and to strengthen the role of the Ukrainian Institute as a key institution for implementing this policy. UI branches have been opened and are operating in several key countries.

The Ukrainian cultural scene is integrated into international cultural life, its voice is strong, its proposals are ambitious, and its actors are capable of international leadership, thus occupying important positions in UNESCO, ICOM, CIMAM, PEN, etc.

The lost national heritage has been partially restored and restituted, while large-scale and skilled work on the restitution of Ukrainian heritage continues.

A unified digital register of movable and immovable heritage has been created, and conditions for the proper storage of immovable heritage are in place. Clear and effective protocols for heritage protection in a military conflict situation have been developed, and effective algorithms for cooperation with other agencies, including the police, have been developed for evacuation, drawing on the experience of the Russian invasion. Heritage is an important component of the public debate on current issues. Training programs for restorers of heritage sites have been resumed.

Art universities have resumed their full-scale operations. The government is reforming higher education in cooperation with independent management teams, which in turn strive to provide education that meets market standards and the needs of modern society. The government is using opportunities for remote education, facilitating academic mobility, reformatting curricula in line with the needs of the CCI market, and launching a program to upgrade the material and technical base.

The pilot projects of cultural service centers (CSCs) in communities are already underway, and their experience is being shared with other regions. The cultural component is taken into account in the development of community development plans, particularly in areas affected by the war. Models of cooperation with local CIs and benefactors, sponsors, and other donors are proposed. Multiple sources of funding are introduced, including state subsidies, donor and private funds, and co-financing from the state and local budgets is allowed.

Minimum standards for providing cultural services to the population have been approved.

It is expected that the restoration of the cultural sphere will take place with significant financial support from donors over a long period of time, so coordination of their efforts and prioritization is important. Donors are encouraged to pay attention to the following:

Retaining, restoring, and expanding human capital: developing abilities to find international partners, conduct digital and cross-sectoral projects, and fundraising, as well as providing direct financial support for core activities. This policy should result in the return of a significant number of cultural workers to Ukraine. At the same time, opportunities for long-term internships and residencies should be created to extend the planning horizon of recipients.

Expanding the scope of grant support for cultural production and institutional development to complement the capacities of state grantors such as the UCF and others. Promote opportunities for collaboration and co-production.

Creation of programs to support the capacities of cultural workers in the frontline zone (evacuation and resettlement opportunities, adequate financial support, communication tools, etc.)

Creation of programs of preferential loans for creative industries, which will lead to the resumption of the search for projects and niches for the realization of creative potential, and the formation of supply chains, including in the international market. It is expected that the overall economic recovery will help to partially restore demand for CI products in Ukraine.

Facilitating partnerships between Ukrainian ATCs and local communities, and regional development funds to rebuild cultural service centers.

2.3 Key issues to be solved to achieve the desired outcomes in the cultural policy

Approach cultural policy, both domestically and abroad, as one of the key security factors, as well as the absolute importance of representing Ukrainian culture abroad.

Maintain a dialogue between the state and civil society to achieve an understanding that culture is created in a bottom-up manner - by civil society actors and individual authors and artists.

Ensure the functioning of the non-governmental sector through a system of grant-funding institutions, such as the UCF and others.

Initiate a public discussion and develop principles of cultural policy in the de-occupied territories, which should include long-term support for cultural institutions and individual actors.

Ensure the proper functioning of national and local grantors - the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, the State Film Agency, and local cultural foundations. To do this, it is necessary to conduct an audit of the UCF, correct mistakes, and, if necessary, re-elect its management, and introduce a procedure for recalling UCF supervisory bodies in case of such bodies' discredit (petitions, general assemblies, etc.).

Ensure the freedom of operation for cultural institutions in the public and non-governmental sectors, particularly to lift restrictions on their commercial and external economic activities.

Empower non-governmental institutions by providing access to public funding not only for projects but also for institutional work. Access should be granted on a competitive basis through the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, local cultural foundations, and other similar national and local granting institutions.

Ensure social guarantees for self-employed persons - artists, writers, musicians, etc. Introduce norms on guaranteed remuneration (fees) when institutions of all forms of ownership are involved in program activities. Revise the principles of pension provision to consider the specifics of self-employed non-entrepreneurial activities.

Ensure the protection of intellectual property rights, in particular, to bring the legislation in line with international standards and to launch the work of the High Specialized Court on Intellectual Property. Conduct educational work and foster a culture of justice in this area.

Ensure an adequate level of protection of heritage sites by adopting new legislation on urban development and construction that will meet the interests of all parties and regulate the activities of private developers in accordance with the requirements of the community and monument protection services.

Maintain and expand government programs for developing of creative businesses, using loan programs and tax incentives, and promote them abroad. Establish a system of CI economic monitoring and include it in the "open data". Develop professional standards for CI professions.

Continue the program of library purchases of books, maintain the practice of issuing vouchers for the purchase of cultural products, and support national forums that promote the development of the industry (Book Arsenal, Lviv Book Forum, Ukrainian Fashion Week, Odesa Film Festival, etc.)

2.4. Policy for solving issues in the cultural policy in the perspective of 2030

Creating conditions for effective management of public cultural institutions

Responsible public authorities and organizations involved: VR of Ukraine, CMU, MCIP, cultural institutions

Amend legislation, in particular the Law on On Culture, Law On Theaters and Theater Business, Law On Libraries and Librarianship, to introduce a new organizational and legal framework for non-profit public cultural institutions. Its main features may include: non-commercial nature of the operation, where all profits are directed to the development of the institution; increasing the authority of the head, in particular, regarding the approval of the structure, staffing, and number of employees; the right to pursue entrepreneurial activities; autonomy of work; mandatory financial and organizational audit of work; public reporting on performance and funds used; permission to use various sources of funding for the institution's budget (state and local budgets, income from entrepreneurial activities).

Improve the procedure of selecting heads of cultural institutions. In particular, eliminate the possibility for local councils and administrations that are founders of cultural institutions to obstruct the appointment of competition winners; add restrictions on the number of terms for which the head of a cultural institution can be elected; ensure professional work of competition commissions by clarifying the concept of "public organization in the cultural sphere" and providing publicity of the makeup and work of the commissions.

Ensure the establishment of independent supervisory boards and advisory bodies in cultural institutions created by central executive authorities, local government bodies, and local departments of independent supervisory boards and councils and to review complaints or comments from creative groups or the public, resolve conflicts, manage reputation, and attract external funds for projects of national or international importance.

Improve the management of museums. In particular, pass a new version of the Law On Museums and Museum Business to bring the definition of "museum" in line with international standards of the museum community; approve the functions, rights, and responsibilities of the museum and the principles of supervision and control over museum activities; introduce mandatory electronic accounting of museum objects; regulate the activities of government-managed museums.

Update the Budget Code to add museum security costs to the list of protected expenditure items of the general fund budgets.
Improve the management of libraries. Adopt a new version of the Law on Libraries and Librarianship. Ensure full implementation of additional payments to employees of state and municipal libraries (for seniority, for difficult working conditions, health care assistance during annual leave, financial assistance for social and domestic issues, and additional payment for years of service). Extend this social protection to librarians working in club libraries, library clubs, and clubs.
Improve certain aspects of theater management. In particular, eliminate the possibility of combining the functions of both director and artistic director in the Law On Theaters and Theater Business; regulate the remuneration of professional artists during their sabbaticals, and the duration of these sabbaticals.
Plan for a transitional period during which public cultural institutions must amend their charters and prepare their creative teams to work in the new environment.
Create conditions for transparent and effective work of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. In particular, to amend the Law On the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation to define clear criteria for civil society organizations that can participate in the election of members of the Foundation's Supervisory Board; to clearly define the grounds for early termination of the position of the Head of the Foundation and members of the Foundation's Supervisory Board in case of failure to perform their duties; to review the procedure for amending the Statute of the Foundation's Supervisory Board.

Maintaining public access to cultural infrastructure in a context of decentralization and overcoming the consequences of war

Responsible public authorities and involved organizations: VR of Ukraine, CMU, MCIP, and local authorities.

● Amend the Law on Culture to allow communities to choose between preserving existing cultural institutions and creating new cultural service centers on their basis. The main criteria should include the will of the citizens, compliance with the standards of cultural services, and social protection of employees of cultural institutions.

● Update the standards for providing cultural services to the population and their implementation based on the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.

Create a regulatory framework for establishing cultural service centers as hubs for the provision of cultural services that can combine several types of cultural institutions.

Amend the Law On Local Self-Government and assign the management of cultural institutions to the Department of Culture.

Ensure sustainable and transparent funding in the cultural sector

Responsible public authorities and involved organizations: VR of Ukraine, CMU, Ministry of Finance, MCIP, UCF.

Guarantee institutional support of cultural institutions by the state. In particular, amend the provisions of the Law On the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation to allow the UCF to hold regular competitions for institutional support grants to ensure competitiveness and job creation in Ukrainian cultural institutions.
Allow public cultural institutions to be financed by the state and relevant local budgets simultaneously. To do this, amend the Budget Code to specify the possibility of financing public cultural institutions from different budgets, as well as the necessary decisions, and the Law On Culture to define the specifics of financing public cultural institutions.
Introduce incentives for patrons who support cultural institutions and cultural projects by amending the Law on Charitable Activities and Charitable Organizations.
Regulate business opportunities for public cultural institutions. In particular, amend the Laws On Culture, On Theaters and Theater Business, On Libraries and Librarianship, On Museums and Museum Business, and other sectoral laws to expand the economic activities that public cultural institutions can perform.

4. Protection of cultural heritage

Responsible public authorities and involved organizations: VR of Ukraine, CMU, MCIP.

Introduce an effective system of accounting for cultural property. In particular, create a Register of Cultural Heritage, which will include: immovable cultural heritage (State Register of Immovable Monuments); cultural property that is part of the core of the Museum Fund; cultural property that is part of the library fund (documents included in the register of national heritage, unique documents); cultural property that is part of the archival fund (unique documents); cultural property owned by individuals and legal entities.

Amend the Law of Ukraine On Culture to establish the Register of Cultural Heritage; the Law of Ukraine On Museums and Museum Affairs to include cultural property of the Museum Fund in the Register of Cultural Heritage and introduce mandatory electronic accounting of museum objects and objects of museum value in accordance with the chosen metadata scheme and deadlines for electronic accounting in museums; the Law of Ukraine On Libraries and Library Affairs to include documents and collections of the Library Fund in the Register of Cultural Heritage; the Law of Ukraine On the National Archival to include the documents of the National Archival Fond in the Register of Cultural Heritage; the Law on Protection of Cultural Heritage to add a provision on recording information from the State Register of Immovable Monuments in the Register of Cultural Heritage; and to establish deadlines for electronic recording by museums, libraries, and archives.

To be included in the unified Register of Cultural Heritage: Register of National Cultural Heritage, Register of Cultural Property Lost During and as a Result of the Second World War, Register of Cultural Property Returned to Ukraine, Register of Cultural Property Related to the History of the Ukrainian People and Located Outside Ukraine, Register of Cultural Property in the National Request List, the Register of Cultural Property Requested by Other States, the Register of confiscated cultural property, the Register of cultural property for which a certificate of export (temporary export) of cultural property from the territory of Ukraine has been issued.

Regulate the principles of restitution of cultural property taken from Ukraine in the course of combat operations. For this purpose, ratify the Council of Europe Convention on Offenses Related to Cultural Property; develop amendments to the Law On the Export, Import and Return of Cultural Property that ensure the accounting of stolen property; add cultural property located in the temporarily occupied territories to the Register of Cultural Heritage; establish a Commission responsible for the return of cultural property; connect museums to the Lost Art network.

Establish a clear division of authority between the Cabinet of Ministers, the MCIP, and the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development to list cultural heritage sites of national importance in the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine; approve the List of Historic Settlements of Ukraine and amendments to it; manage historical and cultural conservation areas of national importance;

Introduce mandatory approval of construction projects in areas of historical and cultural significance by cultural heritage protection authorities, as well as require scientific archaeological examination before approving relevant land management projects; digitize and enter immovable heritage into the Cultural Heritage Register in accordance with international standards.

2.5 Red lines which cannot be crossed in the cultural policy

Given the vital role of culture in nation-building and the formation of a solid national identity, prevent culture funding on a residual basis.

Develop a state cultural policy jointly with cultural and creative sector actors, with a mandatory deadline and cost planning for its implementation.

Not use command and control approaches to implement cultural policy on de-occupied territories. Draw on the grassroots pro-Ukrainian initiatives that existed underground during the occupation; initiate a discussion of the ethical aspects of cooperation involving different positions; rely on young leaders with a pro-Ukrainian positioning.

Prevent fragmentation and inconsistency in implementing cultural policy at different levels while clearly defining the competence of the agencies responsible for developing cultural and creative industries (CCI).

Avoid promoting identity policies based on the idea of exclusivity of a certain ethnicity, censorship, or repertoire restrictions. Instead, promote narratives of civic identity, support, and take into account the ability of the intellectual community to independently identify and respond to threats to Ukraine's sovereignty and Ukrainian culture.

Avoid drastic cuts in spending on cultural projects and eliminate grant institutions that support cultural projects at the grassroots level.

Refrain from political pressure or selective criminal prosecution of leaders of cultural institutions, organizations, and associations.

Simplify the regulatory framework for state cultural institutions (museums, theaters, cultural centers, artistic groups, etc.), preserve the principle of competitive elections of their leaders, and prevent political or administrative influence on such competitions.

Prevent abuse of intellectual property rights and deviations from European norms and practices. Instead, encourage a legal culture of respect for intellectual property rights in the consumption of cultural products.

Avoid shifting security issues to the level of institutions and management teams. Instead, provide clear protocols for evacuating material heritage with a clear division of functions between central, local, and military authorities, as well as employees of the relevant institutions.

3. NATIONAL MEMORY POLICY

3.1 State of affairs in the national memory policy as of early 2023

After the 2019 presidential elections, substantively, the policy of historical memory largely followed the inertia of the previous period - under the sign of decommunization, derussification, restoration of Ukrainian historical memory, and countering the propaganda of the "Russian world" both inside and outside the country.

At the same time, the decrease in funding for the implementation of the state policy of national memory affected the scale and visibility of work in this area, particularly in the communication field. Funding for a number of key infrastructure projects was suspended, including the construction of the Maidan Memorial and Museum, and the National Memory Archive. In combination, this weakening of the UINM led to a decline in policy coordination between different actors, along with imbalances at the national level.

With the intensification of Russia's ideological preparations for a large-scale invasion in 2021, the Ukrainian authorities also began to pay more attention to the topic of national memory:

Verkhovna Rada adopted a statement on February 17, 2021, which defined the Revolution of Dignity as "one of the key moments of Ukrainian state-building and an expression of the national idea of freedom";

Law On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine was adopted, which recognized the Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks;

Verkhovna Rada appealed to the parliaments of foreign countries to recognize the Holodomor as genocide.

The large-scale invasion of Russia on February 24, 2022, naturally accentuated the anti-Russian, anti-imperial discourse and Ukrainian historical experience of struggle against Russian imperialism within the policy of national memory.

At the same time, the acute budget deficit inevitably reduced the possibility of implementing a targeted state policy of national memory. This was partially offset by increased attention to this area at the public level, both at the local community and individual levels.

The processes of practical derussification and decommunization accelerated, both at the central and regional levels, including the eastern and southern regions of the country (renaming of streets, cultural institutions, relocation/deconstruction of monuments, minimization of Soviet and Russian historical content in public space, including mass culture, etc.)

The issue of supporting the liberation movement of the people living on the territory of the Russian Federation was officially raised: the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a statement condemning the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the occupation of its territory and the crime of genocide against the Chechen people.

In the process of building a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Poland, the focus is on shaping the future agenda of bilateral relations, in particular, the fight against Russian imperialism and Ukraine's European integration, and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding that will facilitate a gradual, civilized dialogue on the tragic pages of the common historical past. The time has come to establish a professional dialogue between historians and consider the restoration of Ukrainian burials in Poland, which had been vandalized before the war.

Meanwhile, Viktor Orban’s government artificially increases tensions and blocks further dialogue between Hungary and Ukraine.

In material cultural heritage, it is difficult to assess the scale of real executions and the damage caused by the Russian occupiers to museum property, libraries, and the national archival fund, including the archives of the USSR's punitive and repressive system.

Meanwhile, sociological research shows that there has been a real breakdown and rejection of Soviet historical stereotypes and myths in the public consciousness. In particular, according to a nationwide poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in December 2022, 73% of Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards the disintegration of the USSR and support the decision to condemn the USSR as a communist totalitarian regime that pursued a policy of state terror. 59% of respondents are positive about renaming place names (streets, squares, etc.) whose names are associated with the Russian Federation/Soviet Union/Russian Empire and their figures. The ultimate eradication of the remaining historical stereotypes and myths imposed on the Ukrainian people during the Soviet occupation will take a long time.

3.2 Vision of the achievements of Ukraine's national memory policy in the perspective of 2030

A set of ideas and knowledge of the national community about the Ukrainian past has been formed, which has become a nation-building, consolidating factor in the present and indicates prospects for the future.

The national memory policy is based on the principles of interethnic, religious, gender, and other tolerance.

The policy aims to overcome the consequences of the totalitarian past and change social relations to develop democratic practices, respect for human rights and freedoms, civil tolerance, and restore justice for victims of political repression, genocide, and crimes against humanity that took place on the territory of Ukraine in 1917-1991 and during the Russian aggression.

The process of decommunization of public and state life has been completed. Strategies of deep derussification and decolonization combine work on both the ultimate eradication of the Soviet imperial legacy and the restoration of historical truth, figures, and achievements appropriated or repressed by Russian colonialism.

The supporting construction of the national memory policy is the struggle for freedom, democratic values and statehood, against the genocide of the Ukrainian people, and against the armed aggression of the Russian Federation. A rethinking of other historical events and figures is organically built around these themes.

The policy of national memory plays an important role in the process of negotiations with the EU member states, in particular, in shaping a favorable public opinion towards Ukraine's membership in the EU as a "restoration of the rights" of the Ukrainian nation to participate in building a prosperous and secure Europe.

The policy of national memory has been implemented in the educational process (historical education), museum and memorial practices, and a calendar of public holidays has been formed. Places of remembrance dedicated to the struggle for freedom and against Russia's armed aggression have been built in every community.

The activities of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory are regulated by a special legislative act, and the institution plays a coordinating role between the state, civil society, scientific and educational institutions rather than a programming one.

The UINM acts as a primus inter pares in determining the strategy and ways of its implementation, relying on alliances of civil society institutions representing the existential war experience for millions of Ukrainian citizens. The main task of this structure is to popularize history.

The public discussion of the mutual tragic pages of the past with neighboring nations has returned to the formula "we forgive and ask for forgiveness." The memory of the activities of Ukrainians, Ukrainian state centers, political and social movements of the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe, the Americas, and Australia is integrated into the national narrative.

Ukrainian experts are actively involved in developing a policy of de-communization and decolonization of Belarus and other nations oppressed by Russia.

3.3 Policy for solving issues in the national memory policy in the perspective of 2030

Overcoming the disintegration and fragmentation of public perceptions of the past and the inertia of imperial narratives

Responsible state authorities and involved organizations: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, CMU, MCIP, MES, UINM, UI, NASU, civil society organizations, and independent analytical centers.

Institutional changes are aimed at decommunization, decolonization, free access to archives, and public education.

Adopt a law to regulate the calendar of public holidays.
Enforce Ukrainian legislation on the decolonization of placenames, and remove Russian imperial markers from public space: monuments, placenames, and titles.

Amend the laws of Ukraine to refine the procedure for dismantling Russian imperial and Soviet symbols and monuments.
Together with local governments, review the list of objects protected as art/cultural monuments, removing objects that fall under the laws on de-communization and decolonization. Develop a clear mechanism for preserving such objects after their removal from public space.
Support public dialogue on rethinking previous historical narratives about the shared past with Russia. Provide funding for research and incorporate the achievements of modern historiography into school and higher education. Support documentary filmmaking and educational projects aimed at overcoming the fragmentation of national memory and overcoming imperial narratives.
Maintain an inclusive approach to the formation of Ukrainian historical narratives, particularly by integrating the history of the Ukrainian diaspora, Crimean Tatars, Jews, Roma, and other groups oppressed and persecuted by the Russian/Soviet authorities by specific criteria.

Implementation of these measures during 2024-2030 requires state budget expenditure planning. Performance should be assessed by the following measures:

Removal of communist and colonial markers from the country's public space;
Updating educational programs and textbooks of Ukrainian history;
Updating the expositions of historical and local history museums;
Open access to archival documents of the repressive bodies of the communist totalitarian regime;
The level of public consensus in assessing key events of Ukrainian history as measured by public opinion polls.

Formation of a global agenda, including the expansion of de-communization and decolonization in the territories of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Federation and the prevention of genocides

Responsible state authorities and involved organizations: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, MCIP, UINM, MFA, UI, Ukrderzharkhiv, civil society organizations, and independent analytical centers.

Launch new programs and support existing ones to study the Soviet totalitarian past and the history of the peoples oppressed by Russia, especially Ukraine. In particular, provide institutional support, including grants, for foreign researchers who use unique sources and archival data unavailable in Russia. Encourage research consortia that bring together Ukrainian and foreign scholars.
Support interdisciplinary research and applied projects aimed at the derussianization of Russia, the democratization of Belarus, and restoration of the national memory of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Federation.
Support international programs to study the genocides committed by Russia against various peoples. Spread information about the genocide of such peoples in targeted regions (Europe and North and Latin America) and individual countries.
Prepare documents condemning states that pursue policies based on the totalitarian ideologies of communism, fascism, and rashism for consideration and support by international organizations and influential global and regional non-governmental organizations.
Create a new image of a modernized Ukrainian state and spread information about historical lessons and the importance of the Ukrainian experience of struggle for building a collective system of defense of democracy and preventing the recurrence of the crime of genocide in the world.

Implementation of these measures during 2024-2030 requires state budget expenditure planning. Performance should be assessed by the following measures:

Activity (number of projects, mentions in the media, publications in foreign scientific journals) of the resource center for independent institutions and the public sector of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Federation for training and support of measures to restore their national memory.
Number of states and international organizations that have recognized the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people, condemned Russian aggression as genocide of the Ukrainian people, and recognized the genocide of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Federation.
Introduction of the International Holodomor Remembrance Day as a reminder of the crime that should not be repeated. In particular, the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of an appeal to international institutions to establish such an International Day of Remembrance.
The presence of the Holodomor and Russian war crimes on the territory of Ukraine in the expositions of the key global museum and memorial institutions (number of museums, exhibitions, number of visitors, media attention).
Number of publications and increase in the number of audiences in Ukraine and abroad who share views on the importance of collective defense of democracy and prosecution of regimes that are prone to committing crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression.

Strengthening the "Ukrainian voice" and integration with the European memorial space, Ukraine's being "in the shadow" of Russian narratives.

Responsible state authorities and organizations involved: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, MCIP, MES, MFA, SSU, UINM, Ukrderzharkhiv, UI, universities, civil society organizations, and independent analytical centers.

Develop a strategy for promoting Ukraine in the European memory space. The strategy should include: the promotion of Ukrainian cultural achievements and knowledge of Ukrainian history abroad; joint programs of the UI, UINM, and NGOs to counter Russian and Soviet myths; and work with stereotypes about the Ukrainian past in the public perception of foreigners.
Enhance the international activity of the Ukrainian scientific and cultural community, and involve universities and museums in developing actions abroad aimed at deconstructing stereotypes imposed by Russian propaganda.
Promote the involvement of foreign experts in the study of the history of totalitarianism, Russian imperialism, and Ukrainian history, among other things, based on the declassified archives of the Soviet special services.
Ensure that Ukrainian institutions join European networks operating in memory and culture (e.g., the European Network of Remembrance and Solidarity, and the Platform of European Memory and Conscience).
Ensure monitoring and the possibility of reconceptualizing museum exhibitions regarding inclusion/decolonization of the Ukrainian component. Include a discussion of the role of Ukrainians in the fight against nazism, communism, and rashism in the work of the UI and UCF, creating respective exhibitions about them (Auschwitz Museum, etc.).
Develop and implement programs to raise awareness of Ukraine's history as well as measures to ensure the integration of the Ukrainian historical narrative into the collective memory of citizens of the EU and NATO member states and in the global context.

Implementing these measures in 2024-2030 requires planning the state budget expenditures in Ukraine. The following measures should assess performance:

Integration of important European commemorative dates into the Ukrainian state calendar: August 23 is the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Totalitarian Regimes, May 9 is Europe Day, and May 25 is the International Day of Heroes of the Struggle against Totalitarianism.
Introduction of commemorative dates into the European calendar (Holodomor Remembrance Day, Crimean Tatar Genocide Remembrance Day, Remembrance Day of Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Aggression).
Ukraine's full inclusion in EU programs (e.g., Creative Europe, Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV), which will involve the participation of Ukrainian state institutions in the field of national memory, in the financing of projects by the European Commission.
The presence of the Holodomor and the Russian genocide against Ukraine, the history of the Ukrainian fight for independence in the expositions of the key and specialized museum and memorial institutions.
Information about Ukraine in the school course on the history and geography of European countries.
Establishment of Ukrainian studies programs at European universities.
Rejection of the dominant Russian-centered view of Ukrainian history and its return to the European context.
Presence of Ukrainian topics in the public historical space of European countries (museums, placenames, memorial objects, memorial events).

Building and restoring the memory infrastructure in accordance with the demands of society

Responsible public authorities and organizations involved: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, CMU, Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine, MCIP, MES, MFA, SSU, UINM, Ukrderzharkhiv, universities, civil society organizations, and independent analytical centers.

Adopt a law on the basic principles of state policy on national memory, which will establish the limits of competence of legislative, executive, judicial, and local authorities, the norms of interaction between different authorities, the principles of policy formation and implementation based on scientific research and public opinion.
Include measures to preserve the national memory of the 2014-2023 war in the government's post-war reconstruction program and international agreements on the participation of foreign states and donors in the reconstruction process.
Support research programs to shape the state policy of restoring communities that have experienced genocide and/or occupation.
Support communication and media projects that encourage society to remember and reflect on the causes and consequences of the Holodomor, the deportation of Crimean Tatars, the Holocaust, repression by totalitarian regimes on the territory of Ukraine, and Russia's preparation and conduct of the war against Ukraine's independence.
Update the civic education program for secondary education institutions (restoration of civic consciousness) and support the creation (based on the existing and new institutions) of a network of cultural and educational centers for volunteering, activism, dialogue, and nation consolidation.
Conduct an audit of losses in the field of national memory, develop and implement a plan to restore, and create new institutions and objects.
Create a special Fund for the Support of National Memory to provide grants/financial support to relevant initiatives of the public sector, scientific and cultural institutions selected through a competition.
Create a National Pantheon and National Memorial Military Cemetery, as well as places of remembrance in all regions of Ukraine.
Create a scientific infrastructure to document and comprehensively study the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
Create a National Museum of the Russian-Ukrainian War.
Build the Maidan Memorial and Museum, the Holodomor Museum.
Establish a state-owned Holocaust Museum and renew the commemoration of the victims of Babyn Yar based on the concept developed by Ukrainian historians and representatives of the Jewish community of Ukraine.
Reconceptualize and update the course of Ukrainian history for secondary education institutions, and restore the expositions of national and local museums, including local history museums.
Ensure the full operation of the Archive of National Memory, storage and study of archival materials and documents of the USSR's punitive and repressive system (reconstruction, transportation of archival information, organization of digitization).

Implementation of these measures in 2024-2030 requires state budget expenditure planning.

Policy of social protection and rehabilitation of victims of political repression, social security of fighters for independence.

Responsible state authorities and involved organizations: VR of Ukraine, CMU, Pension Fund of Ukraine, Ministry of Social Policy, commissions for the rehabilitation of victims of political repression, civil society organizations.

Ensure the work of commissions for the rehabilitation of victims of political repression.
Grant the status of a fighter for Ukraine's independence to citizens based on the results of the work of rehabilitation commissions and provide payment of pensions for special services.
Inform citizens about the new rules of rehabilitation to ensure that their relatives can be rehabilitated during their lifetime or posthumously and receive the status of a fighter for Ukraine's independence.

Implementation of these measures in 2024-2030 requires state budget expenditure planning.

3.4 Red lines which cannot be crossed in the national memory policy

Destructive discussions about which political forces, social, ethnolinguistic, and regional strata have contributed the most to the fight against Russian aggression are unacceptable. The only victor is the Ukrainian people.

Prevent the blurring of the responsibility of Russians and collaborators for the crimes of the Soviet and Putin regimes, as well as the understatement of the tragedy of the genocide of the Ukrainian people and other peoples who were the targets of aggression and genocidal policies of the Russian Empire/USSR/Russian Federation.

Oppose the introduction of an "amnesia" policy: complex issues in the realm of national memory need to be studied and discussed.

The realm of national memory should not be funded on a "residual basis," even in the harsh conditions of postwar reconstruction.

4. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

4.1. State of affairs in the field of state-church relations, including measurement indicators

As of early 2023, no program documents in Ukraine would define state policy in the realm of church-state relations. Since 2019, the annual addresses of the President of Ukraine no longer mention this area of social life.

Meanwhile, according to official data, as of October 2022, there were 25.65 thousand religious organizations in Ukraine (excluding the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk regions, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). According to the annual reports of the specialized government agency, more than 37 thousand charters of religious organizations are officially registered. This discrepancy is explained by a double entry of religious institutions (in the statute and the USR). The further problem is that the current registration system supplants the assessment of real support for churches, which allows for the manipulation of public opinion. For instance, according to sociologists, about 2% of the population of Ukraine affiliates itself with the Moscow Patriarchate, while their religious network accounts for 34% of the number of registered charters.

The density of the network of religious organizations in Ukraine is extremely high (on average, one per 1,600 citizens). This is much higher than in civil society organizations or government agencies. The self-organization of religious institutions at the intra-confessional and inter-church levels is also high.

The lack of a sound strategy for state interaction with such an extensive network of religious institutions is only partially explained by the absence of a government body responsible for developing state policy in this area. The State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (SSEPFC), as a service, is designed to implement the policy, which should be formed by a relevant unit of the Ministry of Culture (MCIP), which has not yet been created.

Nor is the problem solved by the existence of a specialized department within the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers' Secretariat, as it does not have the necessary authority. Therefore, instead of comprehensive and strategic measures, we see only sporadic reactive approaches in the form of selective responses to conflict situations.

During 2019-2022, the SSEPFC de facto removed itself from performing the tasks set out in its functional responsibilities. The service did not focus on important issues affecting citizens' behavior, national identity, and public safety. These include: religious processions (despite martial law restrictions); sermons by clergy justifying Russian aggression and attempts to form a Russian identity; collaborationist activities of the clergy; damage to Ukraine's image on international platforms, etc.

In the context of Russian church institutions' support for Russia's invasion, the activities of religious organizations in Ukraine that are managed by Russian centers pose challenges to the security of our state. The counteraction of law enforcement agencies and civil society to the influence of the aggressor country on the Ukrainian religious sphere is not effective enough.

Against the background of processes related to the change of jurisdiction by communities, the religious landscape of Ukraine is far from stabilized. Law enforcement agencies try not to interfere in interchurch disputes, as they often do not understand the specifics of the relevant legislation. This sometimes leads to the erroneous blocking of religious buildings or other measures that impede the exercise of the legal rights of believers.

The misinformation of Ukrainians by the UOC-MP clergy about not being subordinate to the religious center in the aggressor country and disregard for current legislation, in particular Law 2662-VIII, which was recognized as constitutional by the Constitutional Court on December 27, 2022, creates the illusion of pro-Ukrainianism and independence of this church.

According to a December 2022 poll, over half of Ukrainians support the ban on the UOC-MP. A survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in December 2022 showed absolute public support (74%) for sanctions against senior clergy of the UOC-MP involved in supporting Russian aggression. However, it is impossible to implement this public demand legally. The architecture of church-state relations in Ukraine does not provide for the prohibition of churches: these organizations are not legal entities, and this is not on the list of grounds for termination of the activities of a religious institution by a court. This also contradicts Ukraine's international obligations.

The massive movement of Ukrainians outside the country has created a demand for spiritual support (pastoral care) for Ukrainian believers there. This applies to all churches, including the OCU, whose activities are limited by the Tomos to the territory of Ukraine. However, the war is a force majeure that allows for a flexible regulation approach. Solving the problem requires diplomatic efforts by the Ukrainian state, which are currently lacking.

An essential component of Ukrainian civil society is the activity of interreligious associations. Of particular note is the constructive position of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, which actively responds to problematic issues not only of a religious but also of a sociopolitical nature.

4.2 Vision of the state-church relations in the perspective of 2030

The equidistance of civil servants and elected officials of all levels, as well as political lobbyists in resolving issues of church-state relations, is ensured by a special legal procedure for declaring the absence of a conflict of interest in the realm of freedom of conscience.

There is a direct prohibition for the state leaders, MPs, public officials, law enforcement officers, heads, deputies, and officials of local governments or municipal services to defend the interests of individual religious organizations in the allocation of material aid or land, transfer/lease of real estate, etc.

The law entails liability, in particular, by way of warning, suspension, and deprivation of status with loss of relevant benefits, or liquidation by court decision of a religious organization in case of political activity, participation in an election campaign or preparation (including by paying for preparation services) of regulatory acts, as well as for the propagation of political advertising and agitation in the media, sermons, etc.

Disputes between state/municipal and religious institutions, as well as between different churches or religious organizations, are resolved in courts or through out-of-court settlements provided for by the legislation of Ukraine.

The state cooperates (including through transparent co-financing) and provides maximum support for social projects of religious institutions: organization of care for the sick and wounded; rehabilitation of alcohol and drug addicts; assistance to victims of violence, orphanages, etc.

There is maximum self-organization at the level of interchurch and interdenominational councils and joint implementation of interdenominational social or humanitarian projects.

In the confessional landscape of Ukraine, the UOC-MP exists exclusively in the form of a foreign metropolis or exarchate of the ROC. The activities of the Russian Orthodox Church are controlled by the security services of Ukraine, authorized to protect the security and sovereignty of the state until the leadership and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church are involved in the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression committed against Ukraine since February 2014 are brought to justice. The relevant control procedure is established by the law of Ukraine.

The state promotes the protection of the rights of Ukrainian believers abroad, both in the diaspora and among internally displaced persons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has a unit that deals with these issues, and involves believers and religious organizations voluntarily in public diplomacy activities and in spreading the country's positive image internationally.

The state is restoring religious education and enlightenment in educational institutions of all forms of ownership, and compulsory religious studies courses are being taught in higher education institutions. In secondary schools, religious studies are optional at the initiative of parents/teachers and must be supported by local authorities if such an initiative is expressed. Thus, critical thinking and tolerance towards different religions and confessions are fostered in society.

A consistent secularization of political and social life in Ukraine is taking place:

A moratorium on new inclusions of religious holidays in the list of holidays to be celebrated at the state (regional) level is in place;
The practice of awarding clergy with state awards or honors, except in cases of personal courage, has been discontinued;
Any form of financing of religious organizations from the state budget and local budgets is prohibited;
If facts of anti-state agitation, formation of paramilitary structures with the participation of clergymen, or distribution of anti-Ukrainian political literature in religious buildings or on the territory belonging to a religious organization are established, such an organization should be liquidated by a court decision;
Constant financial monitoring of the economic activities of religious organizations is conducted, and safeguards are in place against money laundering or financing of political activities by religious institutions;
The procurement procedure and content of cooperation agreements between state/municipal and religious institutions are unified and regulated;
Granting material privileges to religious organizations for non-religious purposes is controlled.

4.3 Key issues to be solved to achieve the desired outcomes in the sphere of state-church relations

The following legislative, political, and administrative measures are being implemented to achieve the goals:

To invalidate all contracts (primarily leases of state and municipal real estate) entered into by those religious organizations and institutions of the UOC-MP that have grossly violated the law and failed to make the necessary changes (according to Law 2662-VIII) to their charters.

Amend the current legislation and abolish the double registration of religious organizations. The initial registration of the charter and all information (jurisdictional affiliation, address, etc.) should be reflected in the USR. Therefore, a change in the jurisdiction or necessary information (change of address, etc.) will not require re-registration of the charter - only the data in the USR will be changed. This will also help to organize databases. After all, there is currently a significant discrepancy between the number of registered charters (37049) and legal entities registered in the USR of legal entities of religious organizations (25652).

Amend the current legislation and reorganize the state body for religious affairs into the Office of the Ombudsman for Freedom of Conscience (the resource of the state body's functionality has been exhausted, and public demand for its existence and trust in it has been lost). This should be done when the religious landscape is stabilized, and the structures of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine are marginalized. The structure of the Office should also include an international department (strategic communication with international partners and foreign non-governmental organizations) to counter hostile propaganda against Ukraine.

Delegate the functions of development/implementation of global issues of the strategy of church-state relations to a specialized department within the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers and the functions of registration of religious institutions to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

Make it impossible for representatives of churches (religious organizations) to escape (profit from unjustified mitigation) of punishment for crimes or violations. Make court hearings of these cases public to eliminate the possibility of pressure on the court.

Depoliticize the structures of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and prohibit the proclamation of stavropegia of Ukrainian Lavras or large monasteries. Provide the population with objective information about this church.

Introduce a Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ unit to oversee the Ukrainian diaspora and temporarily displaced persons.

Adopt amendments to the current legislation on the secularization of the state apparatus of Ukraine.

Regulate at the legislative level: chaplaincy service (military, medical and other types); ensure the right of medical professionals to refuse to participate in abortion for reasons of conscience; strengthen the responsibility of clergy for the preservation of cultural monuments and religious objects granted for their use.

4.4 Policy for solving issues in the sphere of state-church relations in the perspective of 2030

Improvement of the current legislation of Ukraine in the matter of freedom of conscience.

Responsible state authorities: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU); Ministry of Justice of Ukraine (MoJ); State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (SSEPFC); Security Service of Ukraine (SSU); Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (MIA).

Amend the current law "On Freedom of Conscience..." and abolish double registration of religious organizations (ROs). The initial registration of the statute and all basic information (jurisdictional affiliation, address, etc.) should be reflected in the Unified State Register (USR).
Simplify the process of changing the juridical affiliation of religious organizations as much as possible by amending by-laws and providing the necessary instructions to the relevant local state bodies).
Amend the legislation to reorganize the SSEPFC into the Office of the Ombudsman for Freedom of Conscience. The main function of the new body will be to facilitate the resolution of disputes between different religious organizations, as well as the out-of-court settlement of problematic issues between religious organizations and state or municipal institutions.
Delegate the functions of developing/implementing global issues of the strategy of church-state relations to a specialized department within the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers and the functions of registering religious organizations to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.
Legislatively regulate chaplaincy service (military, medical, in penitentiary institutions, etc.).
Tighten the legal responsibility of religious organizations for the preservation of cultural monuments and religious items provided for use.
In 2023-2024, make appropriate changes to laws and by-laws, and accompany these changes and their implementation with communication campaigns in the media. No additional state funding is required.

Depoliticization of religious organizations and counteracting disinformation of society in the realm of church-state relations.

Responsible state authorities: SSEPFC; the Prosecutor General's Office; the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (MCIP); the Security Service of Ukraine.

Revocation of the status of a legal entity or complete liquidation by a court decision if religious organizations are found to be engaged in political activity or campaigning.
Monitoring and counteracting the use of Ukrainian ROs by foreign religious, political, or economic centers to achieve their geopolitical or economic goals or as a hybrid weapon to split Ukrainian society.
Envisage the liquidation of ROs in court in case of the creation of paramilitary structures under ROs, spreading anti-Ukrainian literature in religious buildings or on the territory belonging to ROs.
Regularly monitor of media outlets (including online publications and social media pages) founded by religious organizations and their affiliated NGOs. If facts of intentional actions aimed at inciting religious hatred and enmity are revealed, closure of such media outlets and prosecution of the perpetrators.
Conducting awareness-raising through the media to inform believers of the norms of the current legislation on the activities of religious organizations; involving interested public structures, including interdenominational or interreligious associations; restoring compulsory religious studies courses in higher education institutions and religious studies classes in secondary schools.

The specified authorities will implement continuous monitoring and prevention of security risks in 2023-2030. Coverage of the results of such work in the media and communication with specific audiences (youth). No additional funding is required.

Cooperation and co-financing of social projects by government agencies and religious organizations.

Responsible state authorities: SSEPFC; Ministry of Social Policy; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Defense.

Involvement of religious organizations in joint projects aimed at:

Care and rehabilitation of the sick and wounded or injured;
Rehabilitation of alcohol and drug addicts
Assistance to victims of violence
Organization of assistance to orphanages, support for family-type children's homes, etc.

Adequate expenditures from the state and local budgets should be provided for in 2024-2030, and such projects should be supported through media coverage.

Preventing religious organizations whose governing centers are located in the aggressor state from operating within Ukraine.

Responsible state authorities: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Ministry of Justice of Ukraine; SSEPFC; SSU; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; MCIP.

Identify all religious organizations (associations) that are directly or as part of other religious organizations (associations) included in the structure of foreign religious organizations whose governing centers are located in states that are legally recognized as having committed military aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupied part of the territory of Ukraine.

Oblige the ROs that have their governing structures in the aggressor state to reflect this fact in their name, as indicated in their charter (regulation), as well as in the documents issued by this RO.

Revoke (if available) or not grant the status of a legal entity to the aforesaid ROs.

Conduct information work to explain to believers the norms of the current legislation on the activities of ROs.

During 2023-2024, ensure the implementation of these measures and provide media coverage. No additional funding is required.

Protection of the rights of Ukrainian believers abroad.

Responsible state authorities: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; SSEPFC; MCIP.

Development of a unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to protect the rights of Ukrainian believers outside the country.
Voluntary involvement of believers and religious organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora in public diplomacy activities and promotion of Ukraine's positive image at the international level.
Assistance in meeting the religious needs of Ukrainian refugees outside the country.

In 2023-2030, the responsible executive authorities should implement these measures, maintaining a constant dialogue with activists of religious and civil society organizations. No additional funding is required.

Restore religious education and enlightenment in educational institutions of all forms of ownership.

Responsible state authorities: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Ministry of Justice of Ukraine; Ministry of Education of Ukraine; State Department of Education and Science of Ukraine; Ministry of Culture of Ukraine.

Amendments to the current legislation to restore the teaching of compulsory and independent courses of religious studies in higher education institutions and elective courses of religious studies in secondary education institutions.

Implementation of these measures in 2024-2030 will require state and local budget expenditure planning. An important area of focus will be a special communication campaign in the media and outreach to parents, educators, and NGOs about the need to foster critical thinking and tolerance for different religions in society.

Development of the constitutional principle of secularism in the political and public life of Ukraine.

Responsible state authorities: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Office of the President of Ukraine; Ministry of Justice of Ukraine; State Emergency Service of Ukraine; Security Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

Prohibition of any form of financing of religious organizations from the state or local budgets.
Conducting constant financial monitoring of the economic activities of religious organizations, establishing safeguards against money laundering or financing of political activities by religious organizations.
Setting a moratorium on new inclusions of religious holidays in the list of holidays to be celebrated at the state (regional) level.
Unification and regulation of the order of conclusion and content of cooperation agreements between state or municipal organizations and religious organizations.
Monitoring lobbying by public officials or officials of local governments or municipal services of the interests of individual ROs in the allocation of material assistance or lands, transfer or lease of real estate, etc. Preventing conflicts of interest of responsible persons in the matter of freedom of conscience.
Form a unified basis for providing religious organizations with benefits in the form of material or energy resources or charitable assistance for non-religious purposes.
Preventing the practice of evading (unjustified mitigation) punishment for crimes or violations committed by representatives of religious organizations. Introduction of mandatory public hearings of these court cases to eliminate the possibility of pressure on the court.
Ending the practice of awarding clergymen with state awards or honors, except in cases of personal courage.

4.5 Red lines which cannot be crossed in the sphere of state-church relations

Neglecting international norms and standards of religious freedom, including the developments of the European Convention on Human Rights and the precedent-setting practice of the ECHR, is unacceptable.

Prevent the neglect of current legislation, especially national security issues and anti-state activities of clergy and activists of church-related civil society organizations.

Respond promptly to threats to the physical or mental health of Ukrainian citizens as a result of the activities of religious institutions.

Refrain from using religious organizations for political purposes and not interfere in relations between or within individual religious organizations if such relations comply with the law.

Prohibit and stop the use of Ukrainian religious institutions by foreign religious, political, or economic centers in achieving their geopolitical or economic goals or as a hybrid weapon to split Ukrainian society.

Respond consistently to the participation of religious organizations in politics (elections) or the facts of their involvement in various forms of political lobbying.

NATIONAL IDENTITY: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, NATIONAL MEMORY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

1. LANGUAGE POLICY

1.1 State of affairs in language policy as of early 2023

1.2 Vision of language policy in the perspective of 2030, including measurement indicators

The majority of citizens perceive competent fluency in the Ukrainian language (in accordance with the requirements of Ukrainian spelling and other standards) as an integral sign of education and civic awareness, regardless of one's background and position.

1.3 Key issues to be resolved to achieve the desired outcomes in the language policy

1.4 The means to solve issues in the language policy in the perspective of 2030

1.5 Red lines which should not be crossed in the language policy

2. CULTURAL POLICY

2.1 State of affairs in cultural policy as of early 2023

2.2 Vision of cultural policy in the perspective of 2030

2.3 Key issues to be solved to achieve the desired outcomes in the cultural policy

2.4. Policy for solving issues in the cultural policy in the perspective of 2030

2.5 Red lines which cannot be crossed in the cultural policy

3. NATIONAL MEMORY POLICY

3.1 State of affairs in the national memory policy as of early 2023

3.2 Vision of the achievements of Ukraine's national memory policy in the perspective of 2030

3.3 Policy for solving issues in the national memory policy in the perspective of 2030

3.4 Red lines which cannot be crossed in the national memory policy

4. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

4.1. State of affairs in the field of state-church relations, including measurement indicators

4.2 Vision of the state-church relations in the perspective of 2030

4.3 Key issues to be solved to achieve the desired outcomes in the sphere of state-church relations

4.4 Policy for solving issues in the sphere of state-church relations in the perspective of 2030

4.5 Red lines which cannot be crossed in the sphere of state-church relations

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